The GCE outage on June 2 2019

I happened to notice the GCE outage on June 2 for an odd reason. I have a number of motion activated cameras that continually stream to a small Raspberry Pi cluster (where tensor flow does some nifty stuff). This cluster pushes some more serious processing onto GCE. Just as a fail-safe, I have the system also generate an email when they notice an anomaly, some unexplained movement, and so on.

And on June 2nd, this all went dark for a while, and I wasn’t quite sure why. Digging around later, I realize that the issue was that I relied on GCE for the cloud infrastructure, and gmail for the email. So when GCE had an outage, the whole thing came apart – there’s no resiliency if you have a single-point-of-failure (SPOF) and GCE was my SPOF.

WhiScreen Shot 2019-06-05 at 7.17.17 AMle I was receiving mobile alerts that there was motion, I got no notification(s) on what the cause was. The expected behavior was that I would receive alerts on my mobile device, and explanations as email. For example, the alert would read “Motion detected, camera-5 <time>”. The explanation would be something like “NORMAL: camera-5 motion detected at <time> – timer activated light change”,  “NORMAL: camera-3 motion detected at <time> – garage door closed”, or “WARNING: camera-4 motion detected at <time> – unknown pattern”.

I now realize that the reason was that the email notification, and the pattern detection relied on GCE and that SPOF caused delays in processing, and email notification. OK, so I fixed my error and now use Office365 for email generation so at least I’ll get a warning email.

But, I’m puzzled by Google’s blog post about this outage. The summary of that post is that a configuration change that was intended for a small number of servers ended up going to other servers, shit happened, shit cleanup took longer because troubleshooting network was the same as the affected network.

So, just as I had a SPOF, Google appears to have had an SPOF. But, why is it that we still have these issues where a configuration change intended for a small number of servers ends up going to a large number of servers?

Wasn’t this the same kind of thing that caused the 2017 Amazon S3 outage?

At 9:37AM PST, an authorized S3 team member using an established playbook executed a command which was intended to remove a small number of servers for one of the S3 subsystems that is used by the S3 billing process. Unfortunately, one of the inputs to the command was entered incorrectly and a larger set of servers was removed than intended.

Shouldn’t there be a better way to detect the intended scope of a change, and a verification that this is intended? Seems like an opportunity for a different kind of check-and-balance?

Building completely redundant systems sounds like a simple solution but at some point the cost of this becomes exorbitant. So building completely independent control and user networks may seem like the obvious solution but is it cost effective to do that?

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.